Army Failed to Anticipate the Attacks by Irregulars
March 26, 2003
By BERNARD WEINRAUB
V CORPS HEADQUARTERS, Near the Kuwait Border, March 25 - In
the days before the war with Iraq, the Army and the Defense
Department failed to gauge the full strength and offensive
strategy of the Iraqi paramilitary forces responsible for
the brunt of the attacks on American soldiers and marines,
high-ranking Army officers said today.
The officers said military strategists, just before the
war, had wrongly assumed that the array of paramilitary
forces would mostly remain in Baghdad to fight American-led
forces there, and would stay underground in defensive
positions in and near southern cities like Basra, Nasiriya
and Najaf. The American military is seeking to seize the
cities on the march to Baghdad.
But the officers said they were surprised at the brazenness
and scale of the attacks, which have left at least 20
Americans dead. "We did not expect them to attack," said
one top Army officer here.
Another top Army officer said, "We did not put enough
credence in their abilities." The officer said the military
had wrongly assumed that Shiite Muslims in the south
opposed to Saddam Hussein, who is a member of the minority
Sunni sect, would rise in support of coalition forces.
But the officer said the Shiites appeared to be too
intimidated to rise against Mr. Hussein in the face of the
paramilitary units, which include the Fedayeen Saddam (one
translation is "Those willing to die for Saddam") and other
groups created by the Iraqi leader to serve as enforcers,
spies and supporters.
Among those units are the Quds Army, created two years ago
ostensibly to defeat the Israelis; the military wing of the
governing Baath Party; and the Special Security Service
Organization, responsible for Mr. Hussein's personal
security. Army officers estimated that there were now as
many as 40,000 paramilitary fighters, perhaps more.
What the United States military failed to grasp, officials
said, was that the paramilitary groups - as well as Mr.
Hussein and his military aides - had obviously studied
American tactics in the Persian Gulf war in 1991.
"They realized our Achilles heel was logistics," said a
high-ranking officer, meaning that a large-scale invasion
requires an influx of trucks and equipment to travel Iraqi
roads.
The resulting strategy, an officer said, was "to wear us
down," to harass and ambush both small and large groups of
troops.
They said some militia units had left Baghdad,
unexpectedly, to move south to control any uprising against
the government, as well as to fight Americans, with
Soviet-bloc AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and, in
some cases, Soviet-built T-54 tanks.
Officers said the militias, in contrast to Iraqi regular
forces, who are mostly draftees, are well paid, well armed
and well treated by the government. The paramilitary forces
range in age from 18 to about 30.
The brutality of the militias, which oversee internal
security and terrorize civilians, leaves them vulnerable to
retribution once the war ends. As a result, officers said,
they are highly motivated to harass American forces and
thwart a collapse of Mr. Hussein's rule.
One Army intelligence officer said the boldness of some of
the militias had surprised the Americans.
The other day, a member of an Iraqi militia, in what seemed
to be a suicide mission, walked toward a tank of the Third
Infantry Division, near Najef, holding aloft a
rocket-propelled grenade launcher, before he was killed by
American soldiers.
The paramilitary groups usually move around cities in
street clothes, on buses and civilian trucks, and easily
avoid detection.
Officers said the paramilitary forces had not only used
harassment and guerrilla warfare tactics against American
troops, but had also employed other techniques. Military
officers here were told today to inform their troops that
the paramilitary groups were changing street and highway
signs to dupe American troops and trap them.
On Sunday, a group of soldiers from the 507th Maintenance
Company, which is attached to the Third Infantry, was
ambushed by paramilitary forces after the Americans took a
wrong turn into the town of Nasiriya. The Army is still
uncertain of the toll. Nine are listed as missing and six
have been captured. Of those, at least four are dead.
Since the incident, officers at V Corps have been told by
their command that any American military convoy in southern
Iraq should be considered vulnerable to the paramilitary
units. Extra security has been ordered for every convoy.
"We probably underestimated some of the things these guys
can do," said one of the highest-ranking officers in V
Corps.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/26/in...b3585fd827395d
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